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Abstract
As important decisions about the distribution of society’s resources become increasingly automated, it is
essential to consider the measurement and enforcement of fairness in these decisions. In this work we build on the
results of Dwork and Ilvento in [1], which laid the foundations for the study of fair algorithms under composition.
In particular, we study the cohort selection problem, where we wish to use a fair classifier to select k candidates
from an arbitrarily ordered set of size n > k, while preserving individual fairness and maximizing utility. We define
a linear utility function to measure performance relative to the behavior of the original classifier. We develop a
fair, utility-optimal O(n)-time cohort selection algorithm for the offline setting, and our primary result, a solution
to the problem in the streaming setting that keeps no more than O(k) pending candidates at all time.
1 Introduction
Many aspects of life are now determined by automated systems, leading to increasing concerns about the fairness
of such systems [2] [3]. Following the pioneering work of Dwork et al. [4], a large body of work has been developed
simultaneously in the machine learning, theoretical computer science and economics communities. There are two
common families of notions regarding fairness: individual fairness and group fairness. In this work, we focus on
the setting of individual fairness. Intuitively, individual fairness requires the algorithm under consideration to
treat similarly-qualified individuals (using a task-specific metric) similarly. Under this notion, algorithms have been
developed for many tasks that are individually fair and efficient. However, in practice, most systems are complex
and consist of many separate building blocks. A natural question is whether it is possible to combine fair building
blocks into a fair composition. Dwork and Ilvento initiated a rigorous study of this topic in [1]. Interestingly, even
for simple compositions, the competition among different tasks for the same individual and the competition among
individuals for the same task already leads to dependent outcomes, affecting fairness. This situation arises naturally,
for example, when there is a limited resource to distribute and individuals must be considered in order of appearance
(see Example 1).
Example 1 (Cohort Selection). Suppose we are building an automated selection system that will select k candidates
by the end of an application period. To ensure our system is useful, we wish to maximize the benefit of the cohort,
but also ensure each applicant is evaluated solely on their relevant qualifications for the task.
More precisely, our goal is to select k individuals from a universe U of n candidates. To do so, we are given access
to a fair classifier C to evaluate each candidate. It is important to note that the fair classifier is oblivious to the
limit k and thus, if more than k candidates are qualified, we must to enforce the limit in a fair way. This problem
was previously studied in [1] as an archetype of fairness under composition. They developed several algorithms for
the offline setting, i.e. where all individuals are available for consideration at the same time, and the online setting,
i.e. when the individuals appear one by one and the system needs to make an irrevocable decision before seeing the
next person.
When considering fairness, we can always compare to a simple baseline: ignore the classifier C and select k
random individuals. In some settings, this baseline shows that a fair algorithm trivially exists, and in some settings,
showing that this baseline cannot be implemented can suggest that the problem has no fair solution.
In this work, our contribution is twofold:
∗Equal contribution
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• The offline setting. When multiple algorithms exist, to differentiate them from the baseline, we consider a
natural notion of utility and develop a new fair algorithm achieving the optimal utility. Interestingly a simple
example shows that even in the offline setting, the algorithms from [1] might lose a constant factor compared
with the optimal utility.
• The streaming setting. The work [1] shows that no fair online algorithm exists (even the baseline of uniform
random selection is not implementable). We develop a relaxed model where decisions need not be immediate,
but at any given point in time, the number of pending decisions must be as small as possible, thus retaining
the efficiency of online algorithms. We give an algorithm for fair cohort selection which leaves no more than
O(k) candidates pending at any given step and achieves the optimal utility.
1.1 Related Work
The baseline algorithm mentioned above, when implemented in the online setting, is precisely the canonical reservoir
sampling algorithm. When also taking the classifier results into account, the problem is related to weighted reservoir
sampling (see for example [5] and references therein). Interestingly, the special case k = 1 is exactly weighted
reservoir sampling, but even for k = 2, the problem is already very different from weighted reservoir sampling with
replacement.
In Dwork and Ilvento’s [1] discussion on equal degrees of composition, it is apparent that theoretically fair
systems can lose a great deal of their usefulness in practice. The authors propose utility as an important metric
for understanding the loss incurred due to enforcing fairness. [6] discusses the implications of composing relaxed-fair
systems. It identifies scenarios where the composed system can be fair, but does not focus heavily on the tradeoffs
made to achieve fairness. This makes it difficult for potential implementors of fair algorithms to assess the costs and
risks. Armed with the tools for utility described in this paper, [6] could provide critical understanding for the reader
about the practical implications of enforcing the fairness they describe.
We make heavy use of the individual fairness definition in [4] (refined in [1]), who source their inspiration for
fairness formalisms directly from [7].
Relevance, impacts, and importance of algorithmic fairness in the current cultural context are discussed through-
out our works cited, but especially in [3], [8]. [9], for example, underscores the importance of algorithmic fairness in
analyzing recidivism.
2 Background
In this work we consider a set of n individuals from a universe U , where we need to select exactly k individuals
fairly based on the output of an individually fair classifier C. In this section we review the definition of fairness we
are considering, build a measure of utility that expresses the discriminative power of C, and develop a fundamental
method for later use, which we call integer exact marginal rounding (EMR).
2.1 Notation
We will use Y to denote a set or list, y to denote an element of that list, and yi for the ith element of Y . A call to
a function named “example” will appear in monospaced font. We include a short index of commonly used symbols
and their meanings for quick reference at the end of the paper.
2.2 Fairness
We follow the definition of individual fairness proposed by Dwork et al in [4].
Definition 1 (Individual Fairness). For a given metric D over a universe of individuals to be classified U , and a
random classifier C : U → {0, 1}. We say that the classifier is individually fair with respect to that metric if and
only if, ∀u, v ∈ U ,
D(u, v) ≥ |Pr[C(u) = 1]− Pr[C(v) = 1]|
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2.3 Utility
We begin by establishing a basic notion of utility for any group of candidates.
Even as we try to measure and enforce fair outcomes from some classification procedure, we must also define
and optimize a utility objective to maintain the ability to distinguish between well-qualified and poorly-qualified
candidates.
Without a utility objective, we can almost always resort to trivially “fair” solutions, such as treating all individuals
the same and using no information about their qualifications. This approach is intuitively not useful, because there
are valid reasons for distinguishing between individuals, and a fair allocation of resources need not be uniform
(discussed in Related Work and further in [1]).
Instead, we consider a simple linear utility function.
Definition 2 (Utility). Consider a set of candidates W whose individual probabilities of selection by C are ~s =
s1, . . . , sn, and with utilities ~u ∈ [0, 1]
n and
∑
i ui > 0. We define the utility of W to be
n∑
i=0
siui (1)
Even though we would like to optimize the utility, following [1], we consider only composition algorithms that do
not have access to the utility values ~u. In many cases, utility may be derived from metrics not relevant to the task
itself. For example, utility may be gained from team synergy, role model status, company culture fit, diversity, etc.
Thus this is a natural setting to consider. Intuitively, in this setting, the algorithm needs to optimize for the worst
case and tries to match the probabilities of C as closely as possible. We formalize this intuition in the following
simple definition and lemma.
Definition 3 (Optimal Utility Cohort Selection). An algorithm A with selection probabilities p1, . . . , pn achieves
optimal utility for cohort selection on ~s if it is a solution to
max
alg
min
~u
∑
i piui∑
i siui
(2)
The following lemma shows that we can optimize the worst case utility, even when the composition algorithm
only has access to the probabilities si from classifier C, and does not have access to the utilities ~u.
Lemma 1.
min
{~u}
∑n
i=0 piui∑n
i=0 siui
≤ min
i
pi
si
(3)
Proof. Let j be the coordinate with the smallest ratio between pj and sj : pj/sj ≤ pi/si, ∀i 6= j. Consider the ~u
∗
vector with u∗j = 1, and u
∗
i = 0, ∀i 6= j. Then we have:
min
~u
∑n
i=0 piui∑n
i=0 siui
≤
∑n
i=0 piu
∗
i∑n
i=0 siu
∗
i
=
pju
∗
j
sju∗j
=
pj
sj
= min
i
pi
si
Thus we see that the ratio of probabilities at the most extreme coordinate gives an upper bound on the utility
that any algorithm can achieve, relative to the original utility. In order to improve the worst case utility, an algorithm
must improve its most extreme coordinate.
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2.4 Dependent Rounding
In this section we develop a solution for Fair Useful Cohort Selection in the special case where the probabilities from
C sum up exactly to the desired number of selection k. The solutions for the general case of both the offline and
streaming settings will build on this subroutine. The solution to this special case is a simple dependent rounding,
but it is worth noting that several common strategies fail to achieve the optimal utility in it.
Example 2. Consider the example with 3 candidates s1 = 0.5, s2 = 0.5, s3 = 1 and we would like to select k = 2
individuals. The optimal solution is to pick {1, 3} and {2, 3} each with probability 0.5. The WeightedSampling
algorithm of [1] selects each subset with probability proportional to its weight, and would select {1, 2} with probability
1/4, {1, 3} with probability 3/8, and {2, 3} with probability 3/8, losing a factor of 3/4 in utility in the worst case.
Weighted reservoir sampling with replacement selects {1, 2} with probability 1/6, {1, 3} with probability 5/12, and
{2, 3} with probability 5/12, losing a factor of 5/6 in utility in the worst case.
Our procedure, called Exact Marginal Rounding (EMR), randomly rounds a list of probabilities that sum to
k ∈ Z into a list of integers so that the expected value of each element after rounding is equal to its original marginal
probability. The algorithm iteratively rounds two fractional entries at a time until there is no fractional entry left.
Suppose the two fractional values are a and b. If a + b ≤ 1, the algorithm randomly rounds one of them to a + b
and the other one to 0 with appropriate probabilities to preserve the marginal probabilities. The case a + b > 1 is
analogous.
Notationally, when we use this tool later, we will either use “EMR(list)” or “EMR(list, 1)”, referring to using
Integer Exact Marginal Rounding in Lemma 2 on list, or we will use “EMR(list, a)”, referring to using the Non-
Integer Exact Marginal Rounding in Corollary 2, up to a value of a < 1.
Algorithm 1: Integer Exact Marginal Rounding
input : Array S of length N s.t. S[i] ∈ [0, 1],
∑
S = K
output: S˜ ∈ {0, 1}N
1 set pendingIndex to 1
2 for i from 0 to N − 1 do
3 if i == pendingIndex then
4 continue to next i
5 set a to S[i]
6 set b to S[pendingIndex]
7 set u to Unif(0,1)
8 if a + b ≤ 1 then
// One gets all, other gets 0
9 if u < a
a+b then
10 set S˜[i] to a+ b
11 set pendingIndex to i
12 set S˜[i+ 1] to 0
13 else
14 set S˜[i] to 0
15 set pendingIndex to i+ 1
16 set S˜[i+ 1] to a+ b
17 else
// One gets 1, other gets remainder
18 if u < 1−b2−a−b then
19 set S˜[i] to 1
20 set pendingIndex to i+ 1
21 set S˜[i+ 1] to a+ b− 1
22 else
23 set S˜[i] to a+ b− 1
24 set pendingIndex to i
25 set S˜[i+ 1] to 1
26 return S
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Lemma 2 (Integer Exact Marginal Rounding). Let s1 . . . sn ∈ [0, 1] be a list of probabilities with
∑
si = k ∈ N.
Algorithm 1 rounds each si such that k elements will be equal to 1, n−k elements will be equal to 0, and E[EMR(si)] =
si.
Proof. We first show that E[EMR(si)] = si, ∀i.
At the current step i, let the two candidates under consideration be A and B, and let their initial probability of
selection be a and b, and their adjusted value after the current step be a˜ and b˜. We must consider two cases:
Case 1: a + b ≤ 1. With probability a
a+b , we set a˜ = a+ b, and with probability 1−
a
a+b , we set a˜ = 0. Thus,
we have for individual A:
E[a˜] =
(
a
a+ b
)
(a+ b) +
(
1−
a
a+ b
)
(0)
= a
The same holds analogously for B.
Case 2: 1 < a+ b ≤ 2. With probability 1−b2−a−b , we set a˜ = 1, and with probability 1−
1−b
2−a−b =
1−a
2−a−b , we set
a˜ = a+ b− 1. Thus we have for individual A:
E[a˜] =
(
1− b
2− a− b
)
(1) +
(
1− a
2− a− b
)
(a+ b− 1)
=
(1− b) + (a+ b − 1)− a(a+ b− 1)
2− a− b
= a
Again, this holds analogously for B.
Next, we show that there are exactly k items equal to 1 and n− k items equal to 0. Note that at every step of
the process, either one of the elements was already integer, or the number of integer elements increases by at least
1 (in a rare case, a + b = 1 and both elements become integer in a single step). We take n steps, and therefore the
final list S˜ contains n integer elements. Furthermore, notice that probability mass is conserved during this process,
so that the final list S˜ still sums to k. Since S˜ contains all integer elements and sums to k, then we know that at
the end there are exactly k individuals with 1 and the other n− k have 0.
Corollary 1. Alg 1 is individually fair.
Proof. By Lemma 2 each individual is rounded with exactly their original marginal probability.
Corollary 2 (Non-Integer Exact Marginal Rounding). Let s1 . . . , sn ∈ [0, β], β < 1 be a list of probabilities whose
sum is equal to βK. We can use Alg 1 to round each si such that K elements will be equal to β and n− k elements
will be equal to 0, and E[EMR(si)] = si.
Proof. Note that there is a 1-to-1 mapping to an input for Alg 1; we simply scale all entries si by 1/β. We know
that Algorithm 1 results in a rounded list S˜ containing exactly k elements equal to 1, so we can then map back to a
rounded list containing exactly k elements equal to β.
3 Offline Cohort Selection
We begin with the scenario of selecting k of n individuals when all candidates are known in advance. Considering
Example 1, this corresponds to the idealized case in which all candidates simultaneously submit their applications
and are evaluated in a single batch. Dwork and Ilvento give a solution to this scenario in [1] (with a constant factor
lost in utility as shown above); we present an alternate one that achieves the optimal utility.
In contrast with the above special case, the sum of probabilities given by
∑
i si need not add up to k. If the
sum exceeds k, the algorithm simply scales down all probabilities so that the new sum is k and it is not hard to
show that this operation preserves fairness. The harder case is when the sum is smaller than k. Scaling up the
probabilities is not possible since it increases the gap among candidates and can be unfair. Intuitively, the solution
is to additively increase all probabilities by the same amount, thus preserving the gap and the fairness. However,
some care is needed, as no probability can exceed 1.
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Algorithm 2: Useful Offline Cohort Selection
input : S: a list of Pr[C(wi) = 1] for candidates w1, . . . , wn
k: number of individuals that must be selected
output: cohort: list of k indices corresponding to chosen candidates
1 sum←
∑
i si
2 set P to S
3 if sum < k then
4 set c to k−sum
n
5 set pi to pi + c, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
6 while ∃pi > 1 in P do
7 distribute (pi − 1) uniformly to all pj < 1 in P
8 set pi to 1
// Now the list sums to exactly k and each item is in [0, 1]
9 set rounded to EMR(P)
10 set cohort to all x ∈ rounded with x = 1
11 else
12 set P to P · k
sum
13 set rounded to EMR(P)
14 set cohort to all x ∈ rounded with x = 1
15 return cohort
Table 1: Behavior of Alg 2
n = 5, k = 2,
∑
i
si < k, no candidates adjusted to 1
si value 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.9
A(si) output 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.0
n = 5, k = 2,
∑
i
si < k, some candidates adjusted to 1
si value 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.8
A(si) output 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.9
n = 5, k = 1,
∑
i
si > k
si value 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.6
A(si) output 0.15 0.1 0.25 0.2 0.3
Problem 1 (Fair Offline Cohort Selection). Given a set of candidatesW , |W | = n, with utilities ~u and an individually
fair classifier C, where Pr[C(wi) = 1] ≡ si, select exactly k candidates fromW while maintaining fairness with respect
to C.
Lemma 3. If sum < k, Algorithm 2 increases each probability si to pi = si + αi ≥ si and all of the candidates j
with pj < 1 receive the same adjustment value αj = v.
Proof. First we observe that pi ≥ si, ∀i. At each step of the algorithm the value of pi either increases, or is clipped
at 1. Since si ∈ [0, 1], ∀i, we therefore know that pi ≥ si.
Algorithm 2 initially adds a constant amount c to every candidate, then repeatedly redistributes overflow evenly
across all candidates with si + αi < 1. We prove by induction that for all i with pi < 1, their increment αi are all
the same. Consider two candidates i, j such that their final pi, pj < 1. As argued above, both pi, pj are smaller than
1 throughout the execution of the algorithm. At the beginning, αi = αj = c so the claim holds.
For the inductive step, assume that after step d of redistribution, we have αi = pi − si = αj = pj − sj . We will
argue that this equality still holds after step d+1. Suppose that in step d+1, the algorithm distributes an overflow
value x to m candidates. As noted before, i, j are among these m candidates. Thus, both pi and pj are increased by
x/m and αi = αj after step d+ 1.
Theorem 1. Alg 2 is individually fair.
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Proof. By assumption, the si we are given are from an individually fair C, thus D(u, v) ≥ |E[C(u)]−E[C(v)]|, ∀u, v ∈
U . To show Alg. 2, is individually fair, we must either preserve or decrease the difference between any pair of
individuals. Let A(u) for u ∈ U denote the probability that u is selected by Alg. 2. Thus we must show, for all
(u, v):
|E[C(u)]− E[C(v)]| ≥ |A(u)−A(v)|
We apply C to a set of candidates from U and obtain two disjoint sets of output candidates: let S(=1) be the set
of candidates whose output A(si) = 1, and let S(<1) be the set of candidates whose output A(si) < 1. Let Sall be
the union of these two disjoint sets.
1. First, consider when
∑
i si < k. Here, each element si ∈ Sall is increased by an amount αi s.t.
∑
i(si+αi) = k.
Then we apply EMR, where we know by Lemma 2 that Pr[EMR selects si + αi] = si + αi. We thus need to
cover three cases.
(a) First, we consider two elements si, sj ∈ S(=1)
|A(si)−A(sj)| = |si + αi − (sj + αj)|
= |1− 1| ≤ |si − sj|
(b) Next, we have si, sj ∈ S(<1) By lemma 3, these candidates all receive the same adjustment. Let this
adjustment be called b.
|A(si)−A(sj)| = |si + b− (sj + b)|
= |si − sj |
(c) Finally we have si ∈ S(=1), sj ∈ S(<1). Note that αi − αj ≤ 0, and si − sj > 0.
|A(si)−A(sj)| = |si + αi − (sj + αj)|
= |si − sj + αi − αj |
≤ |si − sj |
2. Next, consider
∑
i si ≥ k. Here we know
k∑
i
si
≤ 1. By Lemma 2, A(si) =
ksi∑
i
si
. Then, for candidates i and
j, we have:
|A(si)−A(sj)| = |
ksi∑
i si
−
ksj∑
i si
|
= |
k∑
i si
(si − sj)|
≤ |si − sj |
Thus A is individually fair.
Theorem 2. Alg 2 achieves optimal utility for Fair Useful Offline Cohort Selection.
Proof. We must show that Alg. 2 is a solution to
max
alg
min
i
pi
si
(4)
Let S(<1) and S(=1) be defined as in Theorem 1, and note that S(=1) may be empty. Consider for contradiction an
arbitrary fair algorithm A′ with probabilities of selection p′i s.t.
min
i
p′i
si
> min
i
pi
si
1. First, consider the case where
∑
i si < k and S(=1) is nonempty. Let individual j have the most extreme ratio:
pj
sj
= mini
pi
si
. In order for this ratio to be minimal, we know that individual j must have sj > si∀i and be a
member of S(=1). Therefore sj + αj = 1, and we have that for Algorithm A, mini
pi
si
=
sj+αj
sj
= 1
sj
.
By our definition of A′, there is some potentially different most extreme element l s.t.
p′l
sl
= mini
p′i
si
>
pj
sj
.
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• If sl = sj , the largest minimum ratio
p′l
sl
that A′ can achieve is 1
sl
= 1
sj
, which is the same ratio as
Algorithm A and contradicts our assumption.
• If sl 6= sj , we know sl < sj , since we already know that sj is at least as big as all other elements. Then,
by fairness, α′j ≤ α
′
l. Then we can construct the following:
α′l/sl > α
′
j/sj
1 + α′l/sl > 1 + α
′
j/sj
(sl + α
′
l)/sl > (sj + a
′
j)/sj (5)
This contradicts our assumption that
p′l
sl
is the minimum ratio for A′.
2. Next, consider the case where
∑
i si < k and S(=1) group is empty. Again, let element j be the most extreme
element for algorithm A, i.e. mini
pi
si
=
pj
sj
.
Consider A′ on its most extreme element l constructed as in Item 1.
(a) This time, if sl = sj , we may have p
′
l = 1 > pj, achieving greater utility. As before, sj ≥ si, ∀i 6= j.
By fairness, if A′ adjusts element l by a certain amount, it must adjust all smaller elements by at least
the same amount. However, we know that
∑
i pi = k, so this required extra adjustment will mean that∑
i p
′
i > k, and A
′ will not be selecting exactly k candidates.
(b) If sl < sj , then we still know that a
′
j ≤ a
′
l, and we again have the contradiction in (5)
3. Finally, consider the case where
∑
i si ≥ k.
In alg 2, all elements will be multiplied by a factor of k∑
i
si
, and then by Lemma 2, any element will satisfy
pi =
ksi∑
i
si
, so we have:
min
i
pi/si = min
i
(
ksi∑
i si
)/si =
k∑
i si
Notice that in this case, all elements are adjusted by the same constant ratio. Using extreme element l for
algorithm A′ as constructed previously, and again supposing that this element is more extreme than any element
in algorithm A, we derive the following.
min
i
p′i
si
=
p′l
sl
>
k∑
i si
p′l > sl
k∑
i si
Since element l was the minimum ratio for algorithm A′, it follows that for all i,
p′i/si >
(
k∑
i si
)
p′i > si
(
k∑
i si
)
Taking the sum on both sides we see
∑
i
p′i >
∑
i
si
(
k∑
i si
)
= k
As before, the number of elements chosen by algorithm A′ will be more than k, which is a contradiction.
Thus we conclude A′ cannot exist and Alg. 2 achieves optimal utility for Fair Offline Cohort Selection in all cases.
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4 Streaming Cohort Selection
We now consider the streaming scenario, in which decisions are made before all candidates have been seen. Dwork
et al. [1] show that in the true online setting, where decisions must be made before next candidate is observed, a
fair selection is impossible. Specifically, consider an individually fair algorithm that receives a stream of exactly
k individuals; it must clearly select all k individuals in order to complete the cohort selection task. Now, let the
algorithm receive an identical stream, followed by one additional candidate. We know it must select the first k
candidates, based on its behavior on the previous stream; however this means that the k + 1st candidate has no
chance to be chosen, violating individual fairness. Therefore, we know the requirement for strict online decision
making must be relaxed to make progress on this problem.
Motivated in part by the deferred-acceptance algorithm in the context of matching [10], we consider the setting
where candidates are tentatively accepted but might be rejected later on as more candidates come. To maintain the
efficiency of online algorithms, our goal is to minimize the number of candidates with a pending decision at all points
in time. It is clear that the number of candidates on hold must be at least k since we need to accept k candidates
at the end.
Problem 2 (Fair Useful Streaming Cohort Selection). Consider the fair classifier C and candidatesW = {w1 . . . wn},
with utilities xi. Given π, a stream of classifications from C on wi ∈ W , select exactly k candidates from π while
maximizing utility, respecting individual fairness, and with as few candidates pending as possible.
Below, we provide an algorithm that achieves optimal utility as defined in 3 for the Streaming Cohort Selection
problem, while leaving only O(k) candidates pending. The algorithm uses a parameter α ∈ [0, 1/2]. The number of
candidates pending will depend on α and we can set α to minimize this number; we will pick α = 1/2 by default.
The algorithm contains three update rules which are used depending on the sum of candidates seen so far.
4.1 Algorithm Overview
The algorithm maintains a set of k/α candidates with highest probabilities called top and a set rest of the remaining
candidates. As a new candidate s appears, s is added to either top (and thus bumps some other candidate from
top to rest), or they are added to rest. The algorithm needs to make sure the list rest is not too big by rounding
and eliminating candidates. It is tempting to use the idea from the offline case: take two candidates from rest with
probabilities a and b and round them to a + b and 0. However, if at the end of the stream, the total probabilities
is less than k and we need to increase all probabilities, then some probability might exceed 1. The key idea (and
motivation for having top) is that if the total is less than k, the probabilities for candidates not in the top k/α is
at most α. Furthermore, since the adjustment to make the total probability equal to k preserves the ordering of the
probabilities, their increments are also at most α. Thus, it is safe to round probabilities in rest to 0 or 1− α < 1.
At the end of the stream, if the sum of probabilities is less than k then we need to increase all probabilities.
Observe that all candidates in rest have the same increment (due to the additive adjustment procedure, and the
fact that all their probabilities are less than 1 after the increment). We can compute exactly the increment for
the probabilities in top and the increment for all probabilities outside of top. Before the increment, we store all
candidates with non-zero probabilities in top ∪ rest; refer to this set as A. After the increment, we still have the
probabilities of everyone in A and we know everyone inW \A has the same probability (the value of their increment).
The second key idea is that we can round the probabilities in W \A by maintaining a set called randoms consisting
of k uniformly random samples from W \ A. Each member of randoms receives probability equal to 1/k times the
total probability of W \ A. Since everyone in S \ A has the same probability, this rounding clearly preserves the
marginal probabilities. Finally, we can use the offline algorithm to select the cohort from the union of randoms and
A.
The case where the sum of probabilities exceeds k is simpler. The algorithm always scales down all probabilities
so that they add up to exactly k. When a new candidate appears, they receive a probability equal to what C gives
them, times the current scaling factor, and get added to top ∪ rest. The algorithm then scales down all probabilities
so that the sum is exactly k and reduces the size of top ∪ rest by repeatedly rounding pairs of candidate as in the
offline setting. In this case, the list randoms is not used.
We present the algorithm as a series of update rules to be applied when a new stream element s is encountered. The
algorithm keeps track of the sum of the probabilities encountered so far (including the new element s) and performs
different updates depending on the comparison between the sum and k. At the end of the stream, depending on the
comparison between the sum and k, the algorithm also selects the cohort among the pending candidates differently.
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4.2 Before k
Algorithm 3: Streaming Update for new element s with sum+ s < k
1 set sum to sum+ s
2 if top has fewer than ⌈k/α⌉ elements then
3 add s to top
4 else if minimum element in top < s then
5 remove minimum element from top, add it to rest
6 add s to top
7 else
8 add s to rest
9 set rounded to EMR(rest, 1− α)
10 for x with probability 0 in rounded do
11 feed x to uniform random reservoir sampling of size k
12 set randoms to this sample
13 set rest to all x with probability > 0 in rounded
14 if π ends then
15 go to Alg 4
Algorithm 4: Stream End Adjustment, sum < k
1 set P to top
⋃
rest
2 set c to k−sum|π|
3 set pi to pi + c, ∀pi ∈ P
4 for e ∈randoms do
5 set e to
(
k −
∑
pi∈P
pi
)
/| randoms |
6 while ∃pi > 1 in P do
7 set c to (pi − 1)/(|π| − 1)
8 set pj to pj + c, ∀pj ∈ P \ {pi}
9 set e to e+ c · (|π| − |P |) /| randoms |
10 set pi to 1
11 output EMR(P
⋃
randoms, 1)
4.3 Transition
Algorithm 5: Transition Step Streaming Update, sum+ s ≥ k and sum < k
1 set sum to sum+ s
2 add top, rest to pending
3 set top, rest, randoms to empty
4 set scale to k
sum
5 set pending to (pending
⋃
s) ·scale
6 set pending to all x ∈ EMR(pending, 1) with x > 0
7 if π ends then
8 output pending
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4.4 After k
Algorithm 6: Streaming Update when sum ≥ k
// scale is the product of previous incremental weights, and renormalizes the incoming s
1 set sum to sum+ s
2 set incr to sum−s
sum
3 set s to s · scale
4 set pending to (pending
⋃
s) ·incr
5 set scale to scale · incr
6 set pending to all x ∈ EMR(pending, 1) with x > 0
7 if π ends then
8 output pending
Lemma 4. Given a list L of candidates, let pi denote the probabilities that the i’th candidate is selected by the
Streaming Cohort Selection Algorithm acting on L as a stream, and let qi denote the same for Alg 2 acting on L as
an offline array. Then,
pi = qi ∀i (6)
Proof. Let the process outlined in Algs 3, 4, 5, 6 be denoted A and let A have probability pi of selecting candidate
i. Let Alg. 2 be denoted B with probability qi selecting candidate i. A never accepts candidates until the end of π,
thus there are two major cases.
1. π ends with sum ≥ k. Thus we finished after using Alg 6; this procedure selects all candidates who were in
pending at the end of the stream. A candidate i is added to pending in one of three ways:
(a) Candidate i was in top when the sum reached k. At each round, they must survive EMR, which by
Lemma 2 happens with exactly their marginal probability. Therefore we only need to consider the effect
of the incremental scaling adjustments.
First, let scalei, sumi, incri represent the value of these variables at some step i.
Assume we entered Alg 5 and initialized scale at some step j:
scalej =
k
sumj
scalej+1 = scalej ·
sumj+1 − sj+1
sumj+1
=
k
sumj
·
sumj
sumj+1
=
k
sumj+1
Thus we can see by induction that scalei =
k
sumi
, ∀i. Furthermore, we can express the final value of a
single element si, which by definition is at position i in the stream, as:
pi = si · scalei ·
|π|∏
t=i+1
incrt
= si ·
k
sumi
·
|π|∏
t=i+1
sumt − st
sumt
= si ·
k
sumi
·
|π|∏
t=i+1
sumt−1
sumt
= si ·
k
sum|π|
Thus we see that the final pi is adjusted exactly the same as it would be in the offline case.
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(b) Candidate i was added to rest when the sum reached k. This means there was less than k total probability
in top, excluding i. First, we know si ≤ 1 − α, as follows: every candidate in top is at least as large as
si (who is in rest). There are ⌈k/α⌉ top candidates. If si > 1 − α, then the total probability in top is
⌈k/α⌉ · (1− α) > k, which is a contradiction.
Candidate i joined rest using EMR up to 1 − α, which respects its marginal. Then it was added to
pending via EMR up to 1, which again respects the original marginal. As in Case 1a, their chance of
being selected is then
pi = k
si
sum
which is the same as Alg 2.
(c) Candidate i was encountered when sum ≥ k. This is the same as 1a.
2. The stream π ends with sum < k. A has three arrays at this point: top (the greatest ⌈k/α⌉ elements in π),
rest (at most ⌈k/α⌉ elements rounded to 1 − α) and randoms (a randomly selected group of k candidates,
disjoint from top and rest).
No acceptances are made in (Alg 3) until π ends. The top candidates are placed into top, and elements are
added to rest via EMR, which preserves original marginal probabilities exactly by Lemma 2. The only change
in probabilities then comes from Alg 4.
For the purpose of proof, consider a conceptual algorithm A′ that behaves exactly the same, except instead
of randoms it has zeros, a list of all candidates outside of top and rest. This conceptual algorithm ends by
collecting all of the mass in zeros into a set of k random candidates, which becomes the equivalent of the list
randoms in A, and performing a final EMR step to select the outputs.
Each member of top, rest, and zeros is given k−sum|π| , and any overflow is redistributed evenly. Any candidate
i now has the same probability of selection by both A′ and Alg 2: si + αi, and thus Alg A
′, top, rest, and
zeros are given the exact same treatment they would receive in the offline algorithm.
The only difference between A and A′ is that, before the final step of selecting candidates by EMR, A′ selects
k random elements from zeros, and evenly distributes the mass of zeros across these k elements, thereby
constructing a list equivalent to randoms. This step does not change the marginal probabilities of any element
in zeros, because they have a uniform probability before and afterwards and we did not add or subtract mass.
A′ then selects candidates using EMR on the entire list top
⋃
rest
⋃
randoms, which does not affect the
adjusted marginals si + αi. Thus pi = si + αi = qi∀i.
Theorem 3. The Streaming Cohort Selection Algorithm A denoted by Algs 3, 4, 5, 6 is individually fair.
Proof. We have shown Alg 2 to be individually fair. By Lemma 4, A has the same outcome as Alg 2, thus A must
also be individually fair.
Theorem 4. The Streaming Cohort Selection Algorithm A denoted by Algs 3, 4, 5, 6 achieves optimal utility for
Fair Useful Cohort Selection.
Proof. We have shown Alg 2 achieves optimal utility for Fair Cohort Selection. By lemma 4, A has the same outcome
as Alg 2, thus A must also achieve optimal utility.
Theorem 5. The Streaming Cohort Selection Algorithm A denoted by Algs 3, 4, 5, 6 keeps no more than O(k)
candidates pending.
Proof. Any candidate not in one of: top, rest, randoms, pending is considered rejected. The sizes of top and randoms
are explicitly bounded by ⌈k/α⌉. rest is not bounded in size explicitly, but note that the array is maintained by
constantly applying EMR(rest, 1− α). If we ever have more than ⌈k/(1− α)⌉ elements, we have
sum ≥
⌈
k
1− α
⌉
(1− α) > k
This goes to the sum ≥ k case, which no longer adds elements to rest, thus it is bounded in length by ⌈k/(1− α)⌉.
pending is created initially by adding top and rest (⌈k/(1−α)⌉+ ⌈k/α⌉ pending), but for subsequent steps is never
longer than k by Lemma 2. Thus the worst we can do is remain under a sum of k for the entire stream. top, rest, and
randoms will all be kept pending until the end of the stream, but still we have at most ⌈k/α⌉+⌈k/(1−α)⌉+⌈k/α⌉ =
O(k) candidates pending.
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5 Conclusion
Quantifying and optimizing the utility of fair algorithms is an important step for increasing adoption of fair algorithms
requires considering the utility of the algorithm. Our key contribution is to solve the streaming cohort selection
problem both with respect to fairness and with respect to utility, while allowing only O(k) candidates to remain
pending.
5.1 Future Work
An immediate open question following our work is to develop an algorithm with exactly k pending candidates.
In a broader perspective, as demonstrated in this problem, there is a strong connection between fair composition
algorithms and dependent rounding algorithms in approximation algorithms. Perhaps this connection can be used
for other composition settings.
This work focuses only on Individual Fairness, but other definitions of fairness that could be considered. For
example, using Group Fairness (Conditional Parity), discussed in [1], would change the nature of this problem by
removing the strict linear constraint imposed by Individual Fairness. With this definition decisions could be made
sooner in the online case and potentially with better utility.
5.2 Index
Symbol Semantics
k number of candidates to select
n length of input list of candidates
U universe of possible candidates
C a classifier C : U → {0, 1}
W,wi the ith candidate from candidate set W
~x utilities for candidate set W
~s si = Pr[C(wi) = 1]
pi algorithm’s probability of selecting candidate wi
α for
∑
S < k, max constant increase any candidate can receive
αi the actual constant increase wi receives in a candidate pool, αi ≤ α
Table 2: Notation and symbols
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